When religion trumps ethnicity: A regional election case study from Indonesia by ASPINALL, Edward et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences 
1-2011 
When religion trumps ethnicity: A regional election case study 
from Indonesia 
Edward ASPINALL 
Sebastian Carl DETTMAN 
Singapore Management University, sdettman@smu.edu.sg 
Eve WARBURTON 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research 
 Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons 
Citation 
ASPINALL, Edward, DETTMAN, Sebastian Carl, & WARBURTON, Eve.(2011). When religion trumps 
ethnicity: A regional election case study from Indonesia. South East Asia Research, 19(1), 27-58. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3125 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional 
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School 
of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. 
For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
1 
 
When religion trumps ethnicity: A regional election case study from Indonesia 
 
Edward Aspinall, Sebastian Dettman and Eve Warburton 
 
Published in South East Asia Research, 2011, 19 (1), 27-58.  
DOI: 10.5367/sear.2011.0034  
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
Accepted version 
 
Abstract: The authors analyse the 2010 mayoral election in the city of Medan, North Sumatra. Medan is an 
ethnically and religiously diverse city and the authors treat the elections here as a case study of inter-
communal dynamics in local elections in plural regions of Indonesia. The first round of the vote was contested 
by 10 pairs of candidates and occurred in a climate of cross-ethnic alliance building and appeals that, the 
authors argue, are typical of broader Indonesian patterns. The second round confronted voters with a choice 
between a Muslim candidate and an ethnic Chinese candidate who was also a Buddhist. There was a sudden 
switch in the tone and themes of the contest. A concerted campaign was launched to convince Muslim voters 
to support the Muslim candidate, with politicians and religious leaders alike suggesting that it was a religious 
obligation to do so. The campaign proved effective and the Muslim candidate, a member of the province’s 
established political elite, won by a large margin. The article focuses on the campaign teams’ strategies, 
analysing their electoral calculations and the techniques used to appeal to a multi-ethnic constituency. It also 
considers the role played in the poll by Medan’s rich array of ethnic associations. The authors conclude by 
pointing to lessons of the Medan case for wider patterns of ethnic coalition building in Indonesia. They also 
describe this election as an example of the ‘identity switching’ that can take place when political actors choose 
from multiple and overlapping identity categories in changing political contexts. 
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Since 2005, there have been several hundred direct elections of local government heads [pilkada: pemilihan 
langsung kepala daerah] in Indonesia’s provinces, districts and municipalities. These elections have 
heightened scholarly interest in the political dynamics of Indonesia’s regions, an interest that had already been 
sparked by the introduction of decentralization reforms earlier in the decade. Numerous studies of pilkada 
have been produced; most view these elections through the lens of democratization, asking what they mean 
for the consolidation of democracy or, conversely, the perpetuation of oligarchy in Indonesia (for example, 
Robison and Hadiz, 2004; Buehler and Tan, 2007; Erb and Sulistiyanto, 2009). Relatively few have focused 
on their implications for ethnic politics, despite the rich potential they offer in this regard (some exceptions 
include: LSI, 2008; Tomsa, 2009; Subianto, 2009; van Klinken, 2008). 
Throughout the country, as one of us has argued recently (Aspinall, 2011), ethnic symbols and appeals are all 
but ubiquitous in local direct elections, as is a broad pattern of ethnic coalition-building, with aspirants for 
political office knowing that they must build coalitions of the biggest ethnic groups in a particular locality if 
they wish to win office there. Moreover, political party activists believe that voters prefer to vote for 
candidates from the same ethnic background as themselves, especially when their group represents a large 
majority in the region concerned. As a result, there has been greater convergence between ethnic population 
patterns and the ethnic identity of office-holders than was the case under the authoritarian regime of President 
Suharto, when ‘outsiders’ (often ethnic Javanese) were appointed to head regions beyond Java without regard 
for local sensitivities. 
In this article, we offer an analysis of the 2010 mayoral election in Medan, the capital of North Sumatra 
province. A city of 2.1 million people, surrounded by a greater semi-urban region, and Indonesia’s fourth 
most populous urban centre, this city and the province of which it is part have a particularly diverse ethnic 
make-up. In Medan, diverse ethnic associations tend to the social and economic needs of their communities. 
Their leaders play important political brokerage roles. In the election, a total of 10 tickets of mayoral and 
deputy mayoral candidates competed, with the 20 candidates coming from more than 10 ethnic and sub-ethnic 
groups. One of the mayoral candidates who advanced to the second-round run-off, Sofyan Tan, was an ethnic 
Chinese. It is still relatively rare for Chinese Indonesians to stand for high political office. The winning 
candidate was Rahudman Harahap, an experienced bureaucrat from North Sumatra’s Batak Mandailing ethnic 
group. 
In the article, we provide a detailed analysis of the politics of ethnicity in three crucial phases of the poll: 
formation of the tickets, electioneering in the first round, and then in the second round. We identify two main 
trends. First, in the initial two stages, ethnic bargaining, coalition-building and cross-ethnic appeals 
predominated. In this regard, the pattern we see in this election was similar to that in other multi-ethnic 
regions of Indonesia, and helps to explain why the violent ethnic conflicts that occurred early in Indonesia’s 
democratic transition have largely been contained. Second, in the run-off election, there was a dramatic 
escalation of communal tension and mobilization of appeals to communal solidarity. What counted in terms of 
public discourse at this stage, however, was not so much ethnicity, but religion. Sofyan Tan is a member of 
the city’s minority Buddhist community, and Rahudman Harahap is a Muslim, the majority religious group in 
the city and the country as a whole. His supporters waged a concerted campaign urging Muslim voters to 
support Rahudman and depicting the contest as one between Muslims and kafir [infidels]. This development 
caused consternation in the Sofyan Tan camp and among local political actors who emphasize inclusivism and 
pluralism as core features of Indonesian identity. 
Although our analysis focuses on only one political event, and on a city with unusually pronounced ethnic 
heterogeneity and a distinctive political culture, we argue that the trends we identify help to explain broader 
patterns of ethnic and communal politics in Indonesia, including the greater political salience of religion vis-à-
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vis ethnicity. Moreover, our analysis helps to illustrate a phenomenon of more general significance: that of the 
‘identity switching’ that can occur in conditions of political contestation in communally complex societies. 
The dramatically increased emphasis on religious identity that occurred in the second round was not only a 
sudden departure from the pattern in the first round, but it was to a large extent unprecedented in the recent 
political history of Medan. Our study thus resonates with situational analyses of identity politics, illustrating 
how in conditions where citizens may identify with overlapping and multiple identity categories, political 
actors can choose to select and emphasize those identities that confer maximum political advantage in a given 
setting. 
Our article begins with a background description of the city of Medan, its ethnic make-up and its recent 
political history. We then analyse the ethnic coalition-building considerations that informed the creation of 
tickets in the Medan election. In the third section, we examine the campaigning for the first round, focusing on 
the appeals that candidates made for inter-ethnic unity and harmony. In the fourth section, we examine the 
second round of the election, noting the shift from interethnic harmony to religious competition. We conclude 
by reflecting on the lessons and implications of the Medan case for broader patterns of ethnic and religious 
politics in Indonesia. 
 
The politics of Medan 
Medan is amongst the most diverse of Indonesia’s cities, a product of its history as a vigorous commercial 
centre in a region with a strong plantation economy. This history also makes it hard for both residents and 
politicians to draw distinctions between indigenous (or ‘local son’ – putra daerah) and migrant populations, 
as often happens in other parts of Indonesia. The Batak family of ethnic groups originates in the mountainous 
uplands of the province of North Sumatra, but most Bataks were drawn to Medan and its surrounds in the late 
colonial and early independence period (Agustono, 2008). They are divided into several distinct sub-ethnic 
groups, which are further divided into clans [marga]. According to the Indonesia Population Census of 2000, 
Bataks are the largest overall group in Medan, at about 34% of the total population. The census divides Bataks 
into subgroups including the Tapanuli, the largest subgroup in Medan, followed by the Mandailing, the Toba 
and the Karo (see Table 1). (The Tapanuli category is an anomalous one that is rarely used in daily life and is 
probably best viewed as an artefact of the census procedure.)1 Toba Bataks are mostly Protestants, Mandailing 
Bataks are almost exclusively Muslims, Karo Bataks are mixed, as are ‘Tapanuli’ Bataks.2 Malays, who are 
Muslims, form 6.6% of the city’s population, and in the pre-colonial and colonial periods were the most 
powerful group in the lowland coastal regions of eastern North Sumatra, which during the Dutch period were 
divided among several Malay sultanates. 
 
                                                          
1 Tapanuli is a geographical rather than ethnic term that refers to the region now divided between the districts of North, 
Central and Southern Tapanuli in North Sumatra. The main Batak peoples in this region are the Mandailing and Angkola 
in the South and the Toba Bataks in the North. The term ‘Batak, Tapanuli’ (ethnic code number 0107) is the only one of 
the 1,072 ethnic categories used in the 2000 census that includes the word ‘Batak’ (other Batak groups are described in 
the code list simply as ‘Toba’, ‘Angkola’, etc). One possible explanation for why this category appears in such numbers 
in the census result is that many respondents who simply identified themselves as ‘Batak’ to census-takers were entered 
as members of the ‘Batak, Tapanuli’ group by coders. We must add, however, that this explanation is speculative on our 
part. 
2 According to the 2000 census, 55% of the Tapanuli Bataks in North Sumatra are Muslims, while 35% are Protestant 
and 9% Catholic; Toba Bataks in North Sumatra are 79% Protestant, 12% Catholic and 9% Muslim; Karo are 56% 
Muslim, 28% Protestant and 15% Catholic, while the Mandailing are 99% Muslim. 
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Medan has also drawn large numbers of migrants from beyond Sumatra whose descendants now constitute a 
large part of the population. The largest single ethnic group in Medan (if we treat the various Batak groups 
separately) is the Javanese, making up just under one-third of the city’s population. Their presence in such 
numbers dates back to the late colonial period, when many Javanese were brought to work as indentured 
labourers in the region’s plantations. Medan is also home to a significant minority of ethnic Chinese – a 
consequence of migration of Chinese labour into the plantations of East Sumatra in the nineteenth century 
(Reid, 1970). The Chinese population of Medan is recognized as having a distinctive culture that largely 
survived the ban on public expressions of Chinese language and culture under the New Order government. 
Most ethnic Chinese in Medan speak Hokkien and adhere to Buddhism. 
If Medan is a complex ethnic mix, in terms of religion it is a largely Islamic city, with Muslims making up 
two-thirds of the population (Table 2). Islam acts as a cross-cutting factor, uniting many ethnic groups. This is 
much less so for the other religions. Most of the Buddhists are Chinese (88% of all Chinese in North Sumatra 
are Buddhists, according to the 2000 census). The large Protestant minority in Medan is divided into 
numerous churches and sects, including separate Batak ethnic churches. 
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are Buddhists, according to the 2000 census). The large Protestant minority in Medan is divided into 
numerous churches and sects, including separate Batak ethnic churches. 
This diversity has produced a rich complex of ethnic and ethnoreligious associations. Medan has numerous 
organizations based on ethnic identities, some of which date back to the New Order period, others that 
emerged during the subsequent Reform Era. They generally espouse a social mission, such as promoting 
ethnic culture, the maintenance of adat [customary] institutions, holding social activities and engaging in 
community work. Examples from the Batak community include the Jami’ah Batak Muslim Indonesia, 
Komunitas Karo Indonesia Provinsi Sumatera Utara, and according to a local newspaper, there are thousands 
of Batak Serikat Tolong Menolong [mutual help organizations] in Medan based around particular clan names.3 
Founded in 1980, Pujakesuma (Putra Jawa Kelahiran Sumatera – Sons of Java born in Sumatra) is the largest 
and oldest Javanese organization in North Sumatra. It holds social functions, cultural events and religious 
rituals for the Javanese community. Several splinter organizations have emerged as a result of political 
disputes. There are now at least 36 ethnic Javanese organizations in North Sumatra. Their politics are rarely 
exclusivist; several Javanese organizations do not even require members to be of Javanese ethnicity.4 
Studies of Medan’s political economy have focused on the underbelly of the city’s associational life. Medan 
has a reputation for having a cut-throat political and business culture and a tough street life. In particular, it is 
known for the prominence of preman [gangster] groups and the patronage networks that connect preman to 
political parties and the ruling elite (Hadiz, 2004, 2010; Ryter, 2000). Though still playing a role, the power of 
these organizations has markedly diminished due to increased police crackdowns starting in the early 2000s 
and internal conflicts within preman groups. Ikatan Pemuda Karya (IPK), once a dominant preman 
organization, has declined in influence since the death of its founder Olo Panggabean and significant police 
curtailing of the gambling that sustained it. 
More broadly, the patronage politics present during the New Order period have emerged largely intact in post-
reform Medan. Reflecting on Medan’s first post-Suharto mayoral election in 2000, Hadiz (2004, p 628) 
described local party politics and competition as a ‘game of money politics and thuggery’. Abdillah, elected as 
mayor by the local parliament in 2000 (before the introduction of direct elections) is typical of these politics. 
He attained and consolidated power by using his business background and maintaining an extensive network 
of supportive religious leaders and, more subtly, preman groups (Ryter, 2000). His second term was cut short 
in 2008 when he and his vicemayor were jailed for misuse of government funds and profiting from 
government procurements.5 While many figures in North Sumatra practise the same politics as their 
predecessors, since the mid-2000s, they have become more vulnerable to prosecution. Like former mayor 
Abdillah, corruption scandals threaten to engulf both Governor Syamsul Arifin and Rahudman Harahap, 
Abdillah’s replacement in office (and a major actor in the account presented here). In April 2010, Syamsul 
was named a suspect by Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) for misuse of 102 billion 
rupiah when he was head of Langkat district. In October 2010, Rahudman was named a suspect by the North 
Sumatran Attorney General’s Office, based on his links to six cases of graft and misuse of government funds 
from his time as secretary of South Tapanuli district. 
Much less discussed in the scholarly literature has been the complex politics of ethnicity in the city. In the 
past, the lines of patronage that infused political and economic life were also linked to leaders’ ethnic, clan 
and religious identities. Previously, the term ‘Rehap Lunas’ – an acronym created from the four common 
Mandailing Batak clan names of Siregar, Harahap, Lubis and Nasution – was used to point to domination by 
Mandailing politicians of Medan’s local politics and the office of the governor during the New Order 
(Nuryanti, 2004, p 208). In the late New Order years, Malay politicians began to have a greater impact on 
local politics: Bachtiar Djafar, Mayor of Medan from 1990 to 2000, was ethnically Malay, as was the 
Governor (1998–2005) Rizal Nurdin. Ethnic Javanese, and especially Chinese, were more politically 
marginal.  
                                                          
3 ‘Kumpulan Marga Batak Dukung Rahudman-Eldin’, Berita Sore, 30 March 2010. 
4 ‘Pujakesuma Bukan Hanya Untuk Orang Jawa’, Kompas, 11 June 2001. 
5 ‘Walikota Medan Divonis 5 Tahun Penjara’, Kompas, 22 September 2009. 
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With the introduction of greater political contestation in the post-Suharto period, there has been significant 
politicization of ethnicity, with ethnic constituencies and associations suddenly being viewed as potential 
sources of electoral strength. In the main, the pattern witnessed has been one of cross-ethnic alliance building: 
thus the current Governor Syamsul Arifin is Malay and head of the Malay ethnic organization MABMI 
(Majelis Adat Budaya Melayu Indonesia – Indonesian Council of Malay Custom and Culture), but his 
campaign in 2008 promoted him as ‘friend of all ethnic groups’ [sahabat semua suku]. When Abdillah faced 
the voters in the pilkada in 2005, he likewise campaigned on a cross-ethnic platform.6 However, as we shall 
see, even previously marginal groups such as the ethnic Chinese have also become more politically assertive. 
In the regions surrounding Medan, mobilization of ethnic demands has been especially visible in the creation 
of new districts. Between 1998 and 2008, 16 new administrative districts were created in North Sumatra, some 
along strongly ethnic lines. A movement to create a new majority-Christian province of Tapanuli also 
mobilized fierce ethnic and religious appeals. In sum, in the post-Reformasi period, ethnicity has become 
much more politically salient, both in the city of Medan itself and in the province surrounding it. 
The candidates 
A total of 10 pairs of candidates contested the first round of Medan’s mayoral election in May 2010. Most of 
them had backgrounds typical of aspiring local government leaders in regional Indonesia, being former 
bureaucrats, business people or party politicians, some coming from families with long-standing political 
influence. Several were academics or NGO activists, though these individuals had usually combined their 
careers with bureaucratic posts. Overall, the candidate profiles exemplified the continued grip on local power 
by political forces nurtured during the New Order regime that has already been identified in many studies (for 
example, Hadiz, 2010; Mietzner, 2005, 2010). This aspect of the election, however, is not the focus of our 
analysis. 
One striking fact about these pairs of candidates was that every one was made up of two individuals from 
different ethnic groups. In this regard, the contestants followed a political norm that has developed throughout 
Indonesia since 2005: the formation of multi-ethnic tickets to contest local government posts in ethnically 
plural regions (Aspinall, 2011). What makes the election in Medan different from most (but not all) polls 
elsewhere is the sheer diversity of Medan’s population, and the resulting diversity in composition of the 
candidate pairs. In some parts of Indonesia, it is usual for the candidate for the regional head position 
(governor, bupati or mayor) to be from the largest ethnic group in the region concerned and his or (more 
rarely) her running mate to come from the second largest group. In Medan, the diversity of the population 
produced highly varied candidate pairings. The following summary of the backgrounds of the five candidate 
pairs who were placed highest in the first round of voting provides a cross section of this pattern. 
Rahudman Harahap has a long history as a bureaucrat. His time in office has not been without controversy, 
and even as he faced the voters, the media speculated about whether he would be called to answer questions 
about funds that went missing in South Tapanuli while he was the Regional Secretary in 2007. He was backed 
by North Sumatra’s Governor, Syamsul Arifin, who, as noted above, was himself under investigation by the 
Anti-Corruption Commission. Crucial for Rahudman’s success was the fact that from July 2009 he had 
already been serving as acting mayor, during which time he developed something of a can-do reputation by 
clearing up informal traders from street sides and thus improving traffic flow, cleaning drains and organizing 
other basic improvements in Medan’s shabby infrastructure. As a result of this reputation, and the backing of 
Governor Syamsul, he was from the start a favourite; Golkar endorsed him as its candidate when he was 
revealed as leading in the private opinion polls it commissioned (this has become a standard tool used by the 
major political parties when selecting candidates: see Mietzner, 2009; Qodari, 2010). Rahudman’s running 
mate, Dzulmi Eldin, is Malay and a Muslim, and also has a bureaucratic background. He was initially 
endorsed by Partai Demokrat (the largest party in the city parliament) as its mayoral candidate, but when the 
party’s own internal polling revealed Rahudman to have a strong lead, it struck a deal with Golkar enabling 
him to run as the latter’s deputy. 
                                                          
6 ‘Abdillah Kembali Dipercaya Warga & Pengusaha Medan’, Property & Bank, 26 July 2005. 
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Rahudman’s campaign messages prioritized health, education and concern for the poor, and resembled the 
populist discourse of candidates in other Indonesian districts (see, for example, Sulistiyanto, 2009; Tomsa, 
2009). He promised to introduce 24-hour health clinics and build more schools. But otherwise, his programme 
was vague: he pledged to reform health, education, the bureaucracy and economy, but beyond identifying 
these broad sectors, provided little detail. Although he had served as mayor for only five months, Rahudman’s 
campaign centred around his incumbency. Accordingly, he appealed to voters to choose the candidate who 
had already produced results, rather than ‘experimenting’ with unknown candidates.7 
Sofyan Tan was a special case. Sofyan Tan is ethnic Chinese and a Buddhist. He comes from a humble 
Chinese family and grew up in Sunggal, an area known for its graveyards and poverty. He was widely 
publicized as having overcome adversity and discrimination to become a respected public figure.8 A 
successful entrepreneur, he was well known for his charitable and social work. In particular, he had long 
headed an educational foundation (Yayasan Perguruan Sultan Iskandar Muda) which ran a school that 
advanced a curriculum based on mutual respect between ethno-religious groups (it has a mosque, church and 
Buddhist temple on-site) (Nagata, 2003, pp 375–376). He was also an adviser to the Chinese organization 
Pagubuyan Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia (PSMTI, the Indonesian Chinese Clan Social Organization), a 
body that was founded in 1998, which runs social activities and aims to unite the clan groups and represent 
Chinese interests to the government. Sofyan was backed by the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-
P, Indonesia Democracy Party-Struggle), the secular-nationalist party led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, and by 
Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS, the Prosperous Peace Party), a small Christian party that is close to the PDI-P at 
the national level. 
It remains unusual for ethnic Chinese to contest political office in Indonesia. During the authoritarian New 
Order regime, the Chinese were targeted by discriminatory policies and practices that heightened their status 
as a ‘pariah’ entrepreneurial minority: prospering in business, but without a significant political role. Medan, 
too, has a history of anti-Chinese violence: in 1994, a large workers’ demonstration turned into rioting with 
anti-Chinese overtones; in May 1998, as part of the wave of mobilizations that brought down the Suharto 
regime, protests against fuel price rises in the city also turned into anti-Chinese riots that lasted several days 
(Purdey, 2006, pp 113–120). However, in recent years, as in other parts of Indonesia, some ethnic Chinese 
have taken more prominent political positions (Lan, 2009; Tjhin, 2009). As many as 60 ethnic Chinese 
candidates competed for seats in national and regional parliaments in North Sumatra in the 2009 legislative 
elections. Four were elected to the Medan City Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD, the Regional 
House of Representatives) and two to the provincial DPRD.9 
In fact, knowing the obstacles that a Chinese candidate would face, Sofyan originally intended to run only for 
the position of deputy mayor, hoping to use this position later as a springboard for higher office (a common 
pattern in Indonesia). Initially, he negotiated with both Maulana Pohan and Rahudman Harahap, and 
according to members of Sofyan’s campaign team, a deal on a partnership with the latter was reached. 
Rahudman left his decision to run with Eldin until a few days before the nomination of candidates closed, 
leaving Sofyan with little time to decide whether to run and whom to choose as his running mate. Adopting an 
‘if not now, when?’ attitude, he decided to join the contest. Moreover, the PDI-P’s leader, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, was reportedly angered by Golkar’s decision to renege on a deal, and rather than not endorsing 
a mayoral candidate, determined that Sofyan should advance, despite knowing his chance of victory was low. 
Sofyan’s ethnic Chinese supporters felt that they owed a debt of gratitude to Megawati for endorsing one of 
their own: 
‘We knew it would now be tough. But we also knew we couldn’t be half-hearted about it. [If we 
backed down] we thought that the PDI-P and Megawati would view the Chinese community as not 
serious, as if we had been gambling and only wanted to make a bet if we knew the cards we’d been 
                                                          
7 ‘Etnis Tionghoa Berperan Membangun Medan’, Harian Sumut Pos, 20 April 2010. 
8 ‘Dokter Penakluk Badai’, Harian Sumut Pos, 11 December 2009; ‘Sofyan Tan “Tionghoa Wakil Walikota”’, Waspada, 
21 December 2009. 
9 Anto, 2009. See also ‘Gairah Berpolitik Etnis Tionghoa di Sumut Meningkat’, Sinar Indonesia Baru, 7 June 2009; 
‘Pembauran di Sumatera Utara Makin Nyata – 6 Tokoh Tioghoa Duduk di Legislatif’, Harian Global, 4 May 2009. 
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dealt were good ones. We wanted to show we were not like that.’ (Interview with Eddy Djuandi, 9 
July 2010) 
Sofyan selected as his running mate Nelly Armayanti, a lecturer in agriculture at the University of Medan and 
North Sumatra Islamic University, and a former head of the Medan Electoral Commission who had also been 
involved in the NGO scene. Sofyan, with an NGO background himself, believed that choosing a woman was 
desirable in terms of gender equality and for the message it would send to women voters (interview with 
Wahyudi, 7 July 2010). 
Sigit Pramono Asri and Nurlisa Ginting were nominated by a coalition of Islamic parties. Sigit is an ethnic 
Javanese, born in Asahan in North Sumatra; he is an adviser to the ethnic Javanese group Pujakesuma. He is 
also a founding member of Indonesia’s most significant Islamist party, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, the 
Prosperous Justice Party) in North Sumatra and a representative of the party in the provincial parliament. 
Nurlisa, one of two women running for the deputy mayoral position, is a trained engineer, university lecturer 
and government bureaucrat who has also played a leadership role in the ethno-regional organization 
Komunitas Karo Indonesia Provinsi Sumatera Utara (Indonesian Karo Community, North Sumatra Province) 
since 1998. When interviewed later, Sigit explained, however, that he had been more interested in running 
with Nurlisa because she was a woman and for the effects that this would have on his campaign; Karo 
constituted only 5% of the population of Medan, and were thus not a significant voting bloc (interview with 
Sigit Pramono Asri, 7 July 2010). Sigit and Nurlisa defined their campaign largely in Islamic terms. The press 
covered many public declarations by Muslim youth organizations and leaders in support of their campaign, 
which Nurlisa described as being ‘shaped by courteous [santun] politics and Islamic politics’.10 
Ajib Shah, who has an Afghan father and a Malay mother, has a long history as a Golkar legislator in North 
Sumatra. He is from a major political clan (being one of 16 siblings) based in Simalungun, several hours’ 
drive south-east of Medan, where his family is entrenched in business and politics, including in preman 
organizations. His South Asian background does not give him a significant ethnic base, but in legislative 
elections he was able to rely on his family’s connections to political, youth and ethnic organizations in the 
area where he grew up to secure him a seat. Running as mayor of Medan was a new order of challenge, 
however, and seeking to reach out to Medan’s large Christian Batak community, he ran with Binsar 
Situmorang, another bureaucrat. 
Maulana Pohan is a Muslim Batak and career bureaucrat, and held the position of deputy mayor in 2000–
2005. He also ran for election in 2005 as mayor, with Sigit Pramono Asri as his deputy, and backed by PKS. 
At that time, they garnered around 37% of the votes. His running mate, Ahmad Arif, has Minangkabau 
heritage, as indicated by his membership of the Pemuda Ranah Minang [Minang Valley Youth Organization]. 
Minangkabau people originate from the neighbouring province of West Sumatra, but they have a significant 
presence in North Sumatra and other parts of Sumatra. Arif has also been active in Indonesia’s largest 
modernist Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), being a member of the 
Medan parliament for PAN since 2004. Maulana and Arif were backed by PAN and also by PPP, another 
Islamic party, plus Partai Patriot, the party created by supporters of the Pemuda Pancasila, a youth/preman 
group with a strong presence in North Sumatra. 
Among the less successful candidates, the pattern of cross-ethnic coalitions was equally prevalent, as was their 
affiliation to ethnic associations. Thus, Joko Susilo, who ran as an independent, was Javanese and the leader 
of Pujakesuma; he ran with Amir Hamzah Hutagalung, a Muslim Batak. M. Arif (a Mandailing) ran with 
Supratikno,  another Javanese and leading Pujakesuma figure. Special mention should be made here, too, of 
Rudolf Pardede, a candidate who was nominated for the election but was ruled out on technical grounds (he 
could not produce the required valid copy of his high school certificate). Pardede, a Christian Batak, had 
previously been deputy governor of the province of North Sumatra, and when the governor, Tengku Rizal 
Nurdin, a Malay Muslim, was killed in an aeroplane crash in 2005, he assumed the governorship. During his 
                                                          
10 ‘Bersinar Ciptakan Politik Santun’, Harian Sumut Pos, 12 March 2010. However, in Karo parts of town, there were 
numerous campaign posters featuring Nurlisa dressed in traditional Karo dress (we are thankful to Colm Fox for this 
observation). 
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tenure as governor, at least according to some Muslim informants in Medan, he filled many bureaucratic posts 
with Christians, generating resentment among Muslims (interview with M. Hatta, 9 July 2010). Before the 
election, Pardede was seen as a favourite; the fact that his candidacy was aborted, in the view of members of 
the campaign teams of other candidates, meant that the city’s large Christian Batak community became an 
important group of ‘swing voters’, though one that Ajib Shah was best positioned to target, given that his 
running mate was the only member of that community in the contest. 
What can be concluded from the candidate profiles sketched above? First, the contestants represented the 
usual mixture of well established bureaucrats, members of local political clans and well connected business 
people who participate in such elections in regional Indonesia. Sofyan Tan was rather different: being 
ethnically Chinese meant he was not part of the established political class, and his background in social 
activism was also exceptional. He tried to make the most of this distinctiveness by emphasizing the theme of 
‘change’ in his campaign materials and by promising to reform the corrupt government bureaucracy. Second, 
in terms of ethnic composition, the fact that every pair of contestants consisted of individuals from different 
ethnic groups makes obvious how deeply entrenched this pattern is. It has become conventional wisdom in 
ethnically mixed areas that this strategy is a necessity. As one North Sumatran PKS politician explained 
before the poll: ‘if [the running mates] are both Mandailing, if they’re both Javanese, they aren’t going to win 
. . . homogeneous pairs can lose. They [the political parties] don’t take that risk.’ (Interview with Mustafa 
Ismail, 28 October 2009) Choosing mixed candidate pairs was mainly just about generating an image of 
inclusivity that might appeal to a plural electorate, but, as one member of Rahudman’s campaign team 
explained, ethnic headcounting also played a role: 
‘We do this on the basis of statistics. Though we say we are all Indonesian, the fact is that our people 
are still cultural, still primordial. That’s crucial.’ (Interview, Rajamin Sirait, 9 July 2010) 
 
Round 1: ethnic organizations and appeals 
The most successful teams in the first round of voting adopted markedly similar campaign strategies. Their 
campaigns were characterized by general pledges to improve health, education and the lives of Medan’s 
poorest citizens, alongside consistent appeals to a cross section of ethnic constituencies. There was consensus 
amongst campaign teams that gaining the support of a wide spectrum of ethnic and religious organizations 
was crucial to success. 
Press coverage of the campaign reported on how aspiring mayors and their deputies sought support from 
within their own ethnic or clan groupings. Sigit Pramono Asri thus posted messages on his Website 
encouraging the Javanese community to be ‘solid’ in their choice and unite behind him.11 His running mate, 
Nurlisa Ginting, attempted to mobilize votes by appealing to her Karo heritage.12 Maulana Arif, a Muslim 
Batak, used his influence within a prominent ethno-religious organization, Jami’ah Batak Muslim Indonesia, 
to gain its official endorsement.13 Sofyan Tan targeted the Chinese community, with a special subgroup of his 
campaign team consisting of activists from Chinese community organizations, notably PSMTI, who worked 
virtually exclusively to mobilize the Chinese vote. 
However, of greater significance were candidates’ efforts to identify themselves with groups beyond their 
own. This was obvious when it came to the Chinese and Javanese communities. It was widely assumed that 
the Chinese would vote as a consolidated bloc for Sofyan Tan.14 Even so, other candidates tried to align 
                                                          
11 ‘Pemilih Jawa Solid, Pilkada Satu Puturan’, Harian Sumut Pos, 6 April 2010; ‘Jawa Condong ke Sigit’, Harian Sumut 
Pos, 14 April 2010. 
12 ‘Masyarakat Karo Dukung Bersinar’, Harian Sumut Pos, 19 April 2010. 
13 Maulana Terharu Dukungan JBMI’, Waspada, 21 February 2010; ‘Jami’ah Batak Muslim Doakan Sumut Kondusif’, 
Harian Sumut Pos, 25 February 2010. 
14 ‘Sofyan Tan Rebut Suara Tionghoa Maju di Pilkada’, Waspada, 2 December 2009; ‘Nama Sofyan Tan Mencuat’, 
Harian Sumut Pos, 28 January 2010; ‘Jodoh di Tangan Parpol’, Harian Sumut Pos, 30 January 2010; ‘Suara Tiongoa 
Masih Solid, Penentu Kemenangan’, Harian Sumut Pos, 30 January 2010. 
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themselves with, and seek the approval of, Chinese community leaders. Ajib Shah’s campaign team was 
particularly interested in targeting the Chinese, and its efforts were publicized on its Website and in the press. 
It organized public events attended by prominent Chinese figures, displayed posters indicating support from 
Chinese community groups, and mobilized Chinese organizations to participate in publicity stunts such as 
distributing free medicine.15 Apparently, however, such efforts brought little reward. As we show below, 
Sofyan Tan succeeded in capturing the Chinese vote, doing well in areas with large Chinese populations. 
As the largest ethnic group in Medan, the Javanese were seen as an elusive pot of electoral gold. 
Commentators and local research institutes made various predictions about whom the Javanese would support, 
and whether their vote would unite or fracture.16 Candidates such as Ajib Shah and Maulana Arif tried to 
demonstrate affiliation with the Javanese community by holding public events, rallies and meetings where 
Javanese leaders made statements about how this particular pair was the right choice for the Javanese.17 Ajib 
Shah elicited the support of the Head of Paguyuban Jawa Bersatu [United Java Society], while Maulana 
brought the Forum Komunikasi Warga Jawa [Communication Forum of Javanese Residents] on board. 
However, there is no pattern of Javanese bloc voting in Medan’s, or even Sumatra’s, recent political history. 
Those political analysts who were sceptical of a cohesive Javanese vote were proved right.18 The Javanese 
community did not vote en masse for any particular candidate. Even the prominent Javanese organization, 
Pujakesuma, could not inspire its constituents to support its former leader, Joko Susilo, who won only 4% of 
the total votes (Table 3). 
 
Aside from the courting of Chinese and Javanese voters, there were innumerable displays of inter-ethnic and 
inter-religious campaigning. Muslim candidates visited churches, Toba Bataks participated in Karo adat 
[customary] ceremonies, and campaign Websites and posters displayed images of candidates dressed up in the 
traditional costume of any ethnic group but their own. One journalist aptly observed how aspiring mayors and 
their deputies were fast gaining new family, clan and ethnic affiliations. Thus, at a Karo ceremony, both 
Rahudman and Eldin claimed to have Karo blood and clan connections, while Maulana ‘added’ the Sembiring 
                                                          
15 ‘Ajib-Binsar Silaturahmi dengan Masyarakat Tionghoa Medan’, Website: http://ajibbinsar.com/news/30 March 2010 
(accessed 6 July 2010); ‘Etnis Tionghoa Menilai Ajib-Binsar Pasangan Terbaik’, Website: MedanPunya.com, 29 March 
2010; ‘Genta Djiwaku Gelar Pengobatan Gratis’, Website: http://ajib-binsar.com/news/28 April 2010 (accessed 6 July 
2010); ‘Ajib Kian Menguat’, Harian Global, 30 April 2010; ‘Antara Manipulasi Etnisitas dan Politik Uang’, Kompas, 10 
May 2010. 
16 ‘Orang Jawa Dalam Pilkada’, Waspada, 26 January 2010; ‘Pemilih Jawa Swing Vooters [sic]’, Harian Sumut Pos, 10 
April 2010; ‘Pemilih Jawa Solid, Pilkada Satu Putaran’, Harian Sumut Pos, 29 April 2010; ‘Suku Jawa Bisa Buat Sejarah 
di Medan’, Harian Sumut Pos, 9 May 2010. 
17 ‘FKWJ Ajak Warga Jawa Bersatu Dukung Maulana Pohan – Ahmad Arif’, Website: http://maulanaarif.com/, posted 3 
April 2010 (accessed 6 May 2010); ‘Ajib-Binsar Pemimpin yang Merakyat’, Website: http://ajib-binsar.com/news/, 
posted 29 April 2010 (accessed 6 July 2010). 
18 ‘Menebak Arah Suara Warga Medan dalam Pemilukada 2010–2015’, Exposnews, 16 March 2010; Jaringan Pendidikan 
Pemilih Untuk Rakyat, ‘Etnis Mayoritas Tak Menjamin’, Website: http://www.jppr.or.id/content/view/952/85/ (accessed 
8 July 2010). 
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Batak clan to his family tree.19 In the second round, Sofyan Tan pointed to his grandmother’s Javanese 
heritage; in the first round, he also drew on his Karo ‘Ginting’ marga name.20 
In the first round of campaigning, therefore, the tone was notably inclusive. The top candidates appealed to a 
broad spectrum of ethnic, clan and religious communities, knowing that prioritizing one group would be 
politically damaging. Most candidates emphasized Medan’s multicultural fibre, and claimed they were 
capable of representing all sections of Medan society. Maulana and Ajib Shah tirelessly campaigned amongst 
small and large ethnic and ethno-religious organizations, reaching out to all possible corners of the 
community. Ajib Shah was particularly concerned with promoting his team as the ‘rainbow pair’, with a 
Muslim running alongside a Christian deputy.21 His campaign team organized a multicultural festival that was 
attended by leaders from a range of ethnic backgrounds. Participants wore traditional costumes and there were 
diverse cultural displays.22 Rahudman’s engaged in activities that would reinforce this message: for example, 
emphasizing his role in the establishment of Himpunan Tali Persaudaraan, campaign team likewise advanced 
an image of the incumbent as a nationalist leader who identified with all ethnic and religious groups.23 
Rahudman an organization that promotes positive relations between ethno-religious organizations in Medan.24 
It was difficult, however, to compete with Sofyan Tan’s reputation for fostering social inclusiveness. Press 
coverage highlighted Sofyan Tan’s background as an advocate for social justice and minority rights. As a 
member of a once politically marginalized ethnic group, he was portrayed as a symbol of democratic and 
social reform.25 Sofyan’s campaign also built upon his existing public profile from his education work, 
emphasizing his engagement in programmes that promoted inter-ethnic harmony and addressed the needs of 
the poor. 
Candidates and their campaign teams clearly believed the mobilization of ethnic symbols and ethno-religious 
organizations to be a necessary and profitable endeavour. An examination of the distribution of first-round 
votes at the subdistrict level suggests that cross-ethnic appeals were largely effective and – with one strong 
exception that we explain in a moment – it appears voters did not strongly favour candidates who were from 
their own ethnic group. For example, in every subdistrict with a Javanese majority, a non-Javanese candidate 
won the most votes. When we correlated the proportion of Javanese residents in each of the 21 subdistricts 
with the proportion of the vote for Sigit, the top-placed Javanese candidate, we found only a relatively weak 
positive correlation of 0.48 (the positive correlation between the Javanese population and the result for the 
non-Javanese Rahudman was stronger, at 0.61: see Table 4). It is also difficult to see a pattern of ethnic bloc 
voting amongst the Batak sub-ethnic groupings. For instance, although Rahudman is a Mandailing Batak, we 
identified no significant association between the ethnic Mandailing population and the vote for Rahudman. 
Rahudman’s advantage as the incumbent and his high profile as a long-standing government bureaucrat were 
more crucial to his success than the support of his own ethnic community. 
The one exception was Sofyan Tan. Not only did Sofyan Tan’s campaign largely capture the ‘reform’ vote, 
but its success in the first round was in part due to his popularity amongst ethnic Chinese voters. In 
subdistricts where the Chinese made up the largest or second largest ethnic group, Sofyan was generally 
placed first among the contestants. This occurred in Medan Area, Medan Kota, Medan Maimum, Medan 
Sunggal, Medan Petisah, Medan Barat and Medan Timur. His highest result was 35% in both Medan Kota and 
Medan Petisah, subdistricts where the Chinese, according to 2000 census data, were 30% and 27% of the 
                                                          
19 ‘Landek Bersama Warga Karo’, Harian Sumut Pos, 5 April 2010; ‘Antara Manipulasi Etnisitas dan Politik Uang’, 
Kompas, 11 May 2010. 
20 ‘Ormas Jawa Merapat ke Sofyan Tan-Nelly’, Pos Metro Medan, 5 June 2010. We are grateful to Colm Fox for the 
second observation 
21 ‘Etnis Simalungun di Medan Dukung Ajib Shah-Binsar Situmorang’, Sinar Indonesia Baru, 28 March 2010; ‘Lintas 
etnis dukung Ajib-Binsar’, Waspada, 24 April 2010. 
22 ‘Alumni SMAN 1 Jadi Relawan Ajib-Binsar’, Website: MedanPunya.com, 25 April 2010. 
23 ‘Warga Ingin Pilkada Medan Satu Putaran’, Harian Sumut Pos, 30 March 2010; ‘Bersama Jalin Kerukunan’, Harian 
Sumut Pos, 1 April 2010; ‘Calon Walikota Medan Rahudman Harahap Minta Doa Restu Praeses HKPB Distrik X’, Sinar 
Indonesia Baru, 5 April 2010; ‘Rahudman-Eldin Punya Nilai Plus’, Waspada, 15 April 2010. 
24 ‘Satukan Kemajemukan Kota Medan, Rahudman Lantik Pengurus HTP’, Pos Metro Medan, 17 March 2010. 
25 ‘Sofyan Tan “Tionghoa Wakil Walikota”’, Waspada, 21 December 2009; ‘Demokrasi Kian Majemuk’, Harian Sumut 
Pos, 26 February 2010; ‘Sofyan Tan Humanis dan Plural’, Harian Sumut Pos, 28 April 2010. 
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population respectively. His lowest results were 11% in Medan Marelan and Medan Belawan, subdistricts 
where ethnic Chinese made up only 4% of the population. 
 
In fact, though the results indicate that Sofyan won a majority of the Chinese vote, ethnic Chinese organizers 
in his campaign team stress that turnout in the Chinese community was still relatively low, with many 
community members sharing the political apathy of the general population. Others suggest that the classic 
political fear of this community played a role: ‘they are still shadowed by fear, they say that if a Chinese 
candidate wins, it could result in riots’ (interview with Halim Loe, 9 July 2010). Even so, at 0.85, the positive 
correlation between the ethnic Chinese proportion of the population of a subdistrict and the vote for Sofyan 
Tan was one of the strongest statistical relationships we found when examining the vote. 
 
Round 2: The rise of religion 
The results of the first round of voting, which placed Rahudman in the lead and Sofyan second, changed the 
dynamic of the election, pitting a Muslim candidate from the established political elite against a candidate 
who was non-Muslim, as well as being a relative political outsider and a member of the ethnic Chinese 
community. In contrast to the first round, campaigning for the second round (held on 19 June) occurred in 
conditions of considerable communal tension. Religious discourse suddenly came to the fore, with the 
dominant issue being whether it was appropriate for a non-Muslim to lead a majority Muslim city. This 
change occurred despite the fact that the candidates who had been backed by Islamic parties and presented 
themselves as Islamic candidates in the first round (Sigit and Maulana) had failed to garner much support. 
According to many informants, Sofyan Tan’s second place in the first round, and thus his entry into the 
second round, had not been expected by most of his competitors. A member of Rahudman’s campaign team 
believed that this result occurred because the large number of candidates had split the non-Chinese vote. Sigit, 
the PKS candidate, had earlier expressed a similar view, warning before the first round that the Muslim 
community’s vote would be fractured, and that Muslims in Medan were divided.26 In fact, the strategy devised 
by Sofyan’s team had been based on a similar assumption. Team members had predicted that a second-round 
victory would be all but impossible, because they ‘would be brought down with the religious issue’. They had 
hoped to gain the 30% of votes required to win the first round by mobilizing 80% of Chinese voters and 20% 
of the rest. However, they failed to achieve these targets (interview with Wahyudi, 7 July 2010). 
                                                          
26 ‘Bersinar Ciptakan Politik Santun’, Harian Sumut Pos, 12 March 2010. 
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The signature debate of the second round was the question of whether Muslims should vote for a leader who 
was seiman [of the same faith]. Particularly important in placing this theme on the public agenda were leaders 
of MUI, the semi-governmental Council of Indonesian Ulama [Majelis Ulama Indonesia], an organization that 
in recent years has played an important role in promoting a conservative interpretation of Islam in public 
life.27 The head of MUI in the city of Medan, Moh. Hatta, explained that the organization facilitated meetings 
where it was agreed that Muslims should support an Islamic leader. The message to MUI affiliates was clear: 
‘we directed them and they were the ones who then went out to the mosques and the subdistricts [to 
campaign]’ (interview, 9 July 2010). 
Particularly prominent in the campaign was Zulfiqar Hajar, the head of the organization’s Dakwah 
[Proselytization] Commission. Zulfiqar is a local preacher and graduate of Al-Azhar Univeristy in Cairo. His 
organization, Majlis Ta’lim Jabal Noor, cooperates with the Department of Religion in providing education 
and assistance to haj pilgrims. A meeting at its office a week after the first round of the election was attended 
by Rahudman and Eldin, as well as by dignitaries from Golkar, the Department of Religion, other local 
government departments and various Islamic organizations, including radical ones such as Front Pembela 
Islam (FPI, Islam Defenders’ Front). At the meeting, according to a report on the Jabal Noor Website, Zulfiqar 
warned that the Muslims of Medan were at the ‘precipice of a pit’ because they faced the danger of being 
ruled by an infidel [kafir]. Introducing the theme that was to appear repeatedly over following weeks, he cited 
Koranic verses that, as he put it, ‘forbid the Islamic ummat [community] to elect/appoint leaders from among 
the non-Muslim kafir’. The meeting agreed that they would ‘make brochures, bulletins and writings calling on 
the Islamic community to vote for a leader of the same faith and that preachers at Friday prayers and in their 
other sermons and lectures should call on the Islamic community to do the same and not to vote for a leader 
from among the kafir/non-Muslims, because choosing a non-Muslim leader was forbidden in law [hukumnya 
haram]’.28 
Subsequently, there was media reportage of similar meetings and comments. One newspaper reported on a 
gathering where the famous Jakarta preacher KH Zainuddin MZ told the audience that ‘We are indeed not 
electing a religious leader, but in electing a leader we still must do so on the basis of religion. This is because 
we will be held accountable for our actions in the afterlife.’29 Governor Syamsul Arifin, Moh. Hatta, 
Rahudman and Eldin were present at this event. Rahudman attended a similar event on 13 June where a 
preacher, Fahmi Ahmad, told the audience that, ‘Muslims who vote for leaders who are kafir will receive 
heavy torment in the afterlife’.30 The Communication Forum of Preachers [Forum Komunikasi Ustad] 
endorsed Rahudman–Eldin, as did individual leaders of prominent Islamic organizations.31 Despite the fact 
that neither Rahudman nor Eldin had a reputation for Islamic piety or a past history of association with 
Islamic politics, they and the members of their campaign team also began to paint them in more Islamic 
colours. One newspaper that described final preparations on the day of the second vote described the 
Rahudman camp as being enveloped by a ‘religious atmosphere’ as he conducted final prayers with family 
and friends.32 
The campaign to promote ‘a leader of the same faith’ became systematic at the level of daily religious 
practice, where it was the repeated theme at sermons in many of the city’s mosques, and at all manner of other 
Islamic gatherings. One observer said that, ‘every Friday, every sermon was about that issue alone’ (interview 
with Taufan Damanik, 6 July 2010). Moh. Hatta, the head of MUI, agreed that ‘the influence of religion in the 
second round was strong…on the last four Fridays of the campaign I visited several mosques and they were 
                                                          
27 For example, MUI worked with various hard-line Islamic organizations to lobby the government to ban the 
controversial Islamic sect, Ahmadiyah, and has issued edicts opposing pluralism, liberalism and secularism (Gillespie, 
2007; ICG, 2008). 
28 ‘Jabal Noor Jadi Markas Pemenangan’, 20 May 2010, Jabal Noor Website: http://jabalnoor.or.id/?p=241 (accessed 6 
July 2010). 
29 ‘Pilih Pemimpin Sesuai Porsinya’, Harian Sumut Pos, 6 June 2010. 
30 ‘Kemenengan Rahudman-Eldin, Kemenangan Umat’, Pos Metro Medan, 16 June 2010. 
31 ‘Rahudman-Eldin Merapat ke Muhammadiyah’, Pos Metro Medan, 5 June 2010; ‘Didukung Senior dan Para Ustad’, Harian Sumut Pos, 8 June 
2010. 
32 ‘Pilih Kemapanan atau Perubahan’, Harian Sumut Pos, 19 June 2010. 
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all making the same call… This was very different from the first round when there were many other candidate 
pairs and religion was not particularly prominent.’ (Interview, 9 July 2010) 
Although the media did cover some of this sort of activity, they mainly skirted around it. ‘SARA’, Suku, 
Agama, Ras dan Antar-Golongan [Ethnicity, Religion, Race and Inter-Group], a shorthand term for 
designating inter-communal tensions that had been proscribed during the Suharto years, became an 
increasingly prominent topic in the press during the lead-up to the second round of voting. Reports were often 
vague, and refrained from making concrete accusations against particular people. Usually, a community leader 
or political commentator would be quoted condemning the politicization of SARA – particularly religion – 
without referring to a specific incident. Others emphasized the importance of nurturing harmony between the 
different ethnic groups in Medan.33 The police even claimed to be sending intelligence agents into the field to 
follow up any potential SARA issues – once again without referring to the suspicious incidents or individuals 
that necessitated this reaction.34 
In response to the campaign that they had already anticipated, Sofyan Tan’s supporters designed a campaign 
that aimed to depict Sofyan as a ‘tokoh yang pluralis’ [pluralist figure]. They publicized aspects of his track 
record, such as participation by children from all religious backgrounds in his school, and their access to 
different places of worship there. Most controversially, they also had photographs of Sofyan taken surrounded 
by Islamic preachers, and used these in media advertisements and banners displayed around the city. These 
preachers had been supporters of Maulana in the first round; in most Indonesian elections, the losing 
candidates direct their supporters to back one or other of the pairs in the second round. In this election, 
Maulana had decided to back Sofyan. Some of these preachers in turn countered the arguments of Sofyan’s 
opponents with their own interpretations of religious doctrine allowing non-Muslim leaders. Thus, one leaflet 
referred to Koranic verses noting that God would ‘help only those who helped themselves’ and that God had 
‘created humanity in nations and tribes so that they may know one another’ and cited medieval jurist, Ibnu 
Tammiyah, as a source for the claim that ‘An Islamic State run by Muslims, who are tyrannical, corrupt and 
liars, that state will be destroyed, but an Islamic State that is led by a non-Muslim but whose leader acts justly, 
morally, is not corrupt and not a liar will be better, and that state will prosper’.35 One Muslim member of 
Sofyan’s team recalled laughingly, ‘there are lots of verses that can be used and manipulated in the interests of 
practical politics’ (confidential interview, 7 July 2010). 
However, many people thought that Sofyan’s use of photographs with Islamic preachers backfired, with some 
viewing it as manipulation of religious symbols for political ends. One member of Rahudman’s campaign 
team, unsurprisingly critical, said that ‘Sofyan ended up not showing his own identity, instead he borrowed 
the identity of others to protect himself. As a result of this lots of Christians abandoned him, and lots of 
Muslims felt used.’ (Interview with Rajamin Sirait, 8 July 2010) Moh. Hatta, the head of the MUI, described 
his organization’s campaign to encourage Muslim voters to support a Muslim candidate as being a ‘reaction’ 
to the fact that Sofyan’s team had ‘used’ Islam, making ‘Muslim groups feel emotional’ (interview, 9 July 
2010). Even some figures who were otherwise sympathetic to Sofyan criticized him on this score. Political 
commentator Taufan Damanik, for example, argued that seeking the endorsement of religious leaders was 
tantamount to politicizing religion, and that democracy should instead emphasize ‘healthy thinking and 
rationality in voting’.36 
In fact, lurking not far below the surface of the religious-themed campaign was the issue of race. In our 
interviews, when we asked supporters of Rahudman about the campaign to encourage Muslim voters to vote 
for a Muslim leader, individuals were often quick to point to Sofyan’s Chinese identity as a core problem. One 
                                                          
33 For examples of such reporting, see: ‘Hindari Isu SARA di Putaran Kedua’, Harian Sumut Pos, 25 May 2010; ‘Elit 
Politik Terlibat Isu SARA?’ Waspada, 27 May 2010; ‘Sofyan-Rahudman Sudah Mainkan Strategi’, Waspada, 29 May 
2010; ‘Jangan Etnisitas Penentu Pilihan’, Harian Sumut Pos, 5 June 2010; ‘Komisi C: KPU Harus Konfrontir 
Rahudman-Sofyan Tan’, Waspada, 6 June 2010. 
34 ‘Poldasu Sebar Intel’, Harian Sumut Pos, 4 June 2010. 
35 The leaflet is available at the Website: http://nbasis.wordpress.com/2010/06/12/mengintip-kiprah-kampanye-untuk-
sofyan-tan-lembaga-pemberdayaan-muballighsumatera-utara/kampanye-buruk/ (accessed 10 July 2010). 
36 ‘Semua Calon Terjebak Gunakan Isu Sara’, 14 June 2010, is available at the Website: 
http://www.pemiluindonesia.com/pemilukada/semua-calon-terjebak-gunakan-isusara.html (accessed 21 June 2010). 
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religious leader we interviewed, when asked about the religious campaign, immediately explained it as an 
expression of ‘ethnic sentiment’ and a response to ‘discrimination’ practised by ethnic Chinese who favour 
their own kind in business affairs. A non-Muslim who was part of Rahudman’s campaign team alleged that: 
‘Lots of Chinese aren’t really concerned about Medan, when there were riots in 1998, lots of them 
fled to Penang, to Singapore. It’s like they are only seeking profit in Medan, only staying here 
temporarily, only boarding. They have the mentality of boarders.’ (Interview, 8 July 2010) 
Informants also recalled anonymous leaflets and SMS messages that warned of the dangers of Chinese 
dominance, or which supposedly detailed plans for a Chinese takeover. At one point, a PDI-P leader had to 
deny that Sofyan’s campaign team had authored a widely circulated leaflet, purporting to be from the 
campaign team, entitled ‘Chinese movement to support Sofyan Tan and Nelly’, which, among other things, 
said that Sofyan aimed to turn Medan into a ‘Chinatown’.37 Leaflets reproduced on the Majlis Ta’lim Jabal 
Noor Website, as well as listing various religious directives, included the warning that kafir ‘betray the 
Indonesian nation’ and then listed several high-profile corruption cases involving Chinese businessmen, 
noting that ‘they are all from the same ethnic group’.38 Such commentary is a standard part of anti-Chinese 
prejudice in Indonesia. Insofar as it was linked to religious discourse, the campaign also continued a tradition 
in Indonesian politics whereby Islamist groups are a source of some of the bitterest opposition to ethnic 
Chinese.39 
This is not to say that the campaign against Sofyan took only a religious and ethnic form. Sofyan took a case 
to the Constitutional Court alleging that the government bureaucracy had been mobilized on behalf of 
Rahudman’s campaign, and that in areas that had voted strongly for Sofyan in the first round, there was a 
systematic campaign to deprive voters of their chance to cast a second ballot, as well as other irregularities in 
the administration and counting of the vote. Some, too, saw the timing of the second round – in the holidays at 
a time when many wealthier members of Medan’s Chinese community leave the town – as suspicious. While 
there was much media and anecdotal evidence to support at least some of these allegations, our own research 
did not focus on this issue and we do not feel in a position to comment conclusively on it. Certainly, it appears 
that ‘money politics’ was a feature of this campaigning, as in other local elections in Indonesia. It is likely that 
both sides would have spent much more than the amounts they reported to the election commission 
(Rupiah1.8 billion, or approximately $200,000 by the Sofyan team; Rupiah2.6 billion, or approximately 
$280,000 by the Rahudman campaign). The Constitutional Court ruled that, while there was evidence of some 
violations by the Rahudman camp, they did not occur on a scale that would have changed the result.40 Nor did 
most of our informants, from either side, believe they were decisive. 
Despite the bureaucratic mobilization and the ethnic undertones of some of the negative campaigning, 
protagonists from both sides agree that the thrust of the campaigning against Sofyan in the second round was 
on the issue of religion, not race. All agreed, too, that it was the campaign on religion that made the biggest 
difference in securing Rahudman’s victory. A community leader who wished to remain anonymous told the 
main local newspaper immediately after the poll: ‘If Rahudman’s opponent had not been a non-Muslim, I 
guarantee it is not certain that Rahudman would have been elected by the people’.41 The logic here was 
simple: a campaign focusing on religion made sense in terms of the city’s demographics. Although Medan’s 
ethnic map is complex and fractured, Muslims are a large majority, so mobilizing around the banner of Islam 
was electorally effective. 
The final result was a convincing victory for Rahudman, with 66% of the vote, against 34% for Sofyan, 
figures that are not too different from the religious composition of the city’s population. With a slight increase 
                                                          
37 ‘Soal Selebaran Sopyan Tan: Kami Tak Pernah Membuatnya’, DNA Berita, 8 June 2010. 
38 The leaflet is entitled ‘10 Alasan Muslim Untuk Tidak Memilih Orang Kafir Sebagai Pemimpinnya’ and is available at 
the Website: http://jabalnoor.or.id/?p=255 (accessed 9 July 2010). 
39 In particular, various Islamist groups were leading forces in stoking anti-Chinese sentiment around the time of the riots 
that accompanied the downfall of Suharto (Sidel, 1998). 
40 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Putusan Nomor 68/Phpu.D-Viii/2010. 
41 ‘Rahudman Menang Karena Faktor Agama?’ Waspada, 20 June 2010. 
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in the participation rate, it appears that the religious campaign did galvanize many voters. Unlike in the first 
round of the vote, when the ethnic identity of candidates appeared to have a weak influence on most non-
Chinese voters, in the second round there was a very strong correlation between the religious breakdown in 
each of the 21 subdistrict populations and the election results in those subdistricts. There was a strong positive 
association between the proportion of subdistrict populations that were Muslim and the vote for Rahudman. 
At 0.93, this correlation was much larger than any other correlation we found.  
Sofyan won with 58% of the vote in Medan Tuntungan and Medan Baru, two majority non-Muslim 
subdistricts. He also gained a narrow victory in Medan Petisah, where the Chinese constitute the largest group 
and where there is a significant Christian community (26% of the total population). In Medan Kota, another 
subdistrict made up of large numbers of Christians and Chinese Buddhists, Sofyan was beaten by a small 
margin. Among campaigners, there was general agreement that many of Sofyan’s new votes came from 
Christian Bataks who had previously supported Ajib Shah because of his pairing with Binsar Situmorang. 
This conclusion would appear to be supported: not only did a vote for Sofyan correlate positively with the 
overall non-Muslim population at the subdistrict level (also, of course, at 0.93), but so too did it correlate 
(albeit a little less strongly) with Christianity (0.74).  
In fact, Sofyan’s ethnic Chinese vote may have declined somewhat in the second round, with poll scrutineers 
noting a lower turnout in booths in Chinese districts that had voted strongly for Sofyan in round one (they 
ascribed this to a combination of deliberate sabotage, holidays and the anti-Sofyan campaign). Certainly, the 
positive correlation between Chinese ethnicity in a subdistrict population and a vote for Sofyan was much less 
strong in the second round than in the first (declining from 0.85 to 0.23). Overall, the picture is one of an 
election that became polarized along religious lines. Most Muslim voters who had supported other candidates 
in the first round apparently now voted for Rahudman, although a segment of them of course still voted for his 
opponent. 
Despite the tension in the second round of the campaign, Sofyan Tan’s ethnic Chinese supporters were 
satisfied with the result. Seeing his candidacy as part of a long-term effort to improve the image of the 
Chinese community and to show that Chinese Indonesians can make contributions not only in the private 
economy but also in public life, they felt, in the words of one individual, ‘very proud and very respected’ that 
Sofyan had achieved such a vote. ‘People from becak [motorcycle rickshaw] drivers to vegetable sellers voted 
for Sofyan. There was recognition of the Chinese community [from non-Chinese citizens]. That was all we 
wanted.’ (Interview with Halim Loe, 9 July 2010) 
 
Conclusion 
As we have noted from the outset, the case study of electoral politics presented in this article is about a 
distinctive context. The city of Medan is unusually ethnically diverse, even by Indonesian standards, and there 
are distinctive aspects of local political culture that also had a bearing on the race, such as the continuing 
prominence of preman organizations. The fact that one of the leading candidates in the election was ethnically 
Chinese, rather than from one of Indonesia’s many ‘indigenous’ [pribumi] ethnic groups, also gave this 
election an unusual dynamic. 
But with this caveat in mind, the Medan election does highlight several significant aspects of the 
contemporary politics of ethnicity in Indonesia, some of which point towards promising directions for future 
research. First, there was the central role played by cross-ethnic coalition building and appeals. Our analysis 
shows how, at every stage of the election – when choosing running mates, forming campaign teams and 
campaigning – candidates were acutely conscious that appealing beyond one’s own ethnic group was essential 
to electoral success. Although the ethnic map in Medan is particularly complex, adding intricacy to the 
coalition-building efforts, similar patterns are visible across Indonesia, but have been almost entirely 
unstudied. Despite the fact that it is relatively straightforward to identify the ubiquity of ethnic alliance-
building, we do not yet know how effective the strategy is, what variations are possible in it, what sorts of 
coalitions are likely to succeed, the conditions under which electorates vote for candidates from minority 
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groups, or the answers to a host of similar questions. This is an area of Indonesian politics that is ripe for 
comparative and quantitative analysis, if the appropriate data can be collected. 
Second, our analysis points to the prominent public role played by ethnic associations in Indonesia. Even 
though many of our informants believed that the organizations themselves were ineffective at delivering large 
blocs of ethnic voters, the fact remains that every candidate pair sought their endorsement, and many of the 
candidates themselves were members. Such associations have also been little studied, though there are 
indications that they are ubiquitous in many parts of Indonesia, not just in North Sumatra (van Klinken, 2008). 
Their significance in the electoral context points to the possible bearing they may have in other areas of social 
and political life. For instance, during the transition to democracy, many observers were puzzled by the fact 
that ethnic rioting (apart from the anti-Chinese episodes of 1998) did not take place in Medan, despite the 
city’s diverse make-up. Could it be that the density of ethnic associational life, along with the pattern of 
interaction between organizations that electoral politics point towards, is one explanation? Certainly, in the 
context of our research, we heard many reports from informants about meetings between ethnic and religious 
leaders and organizations to discuss and ameliorate points of communal tension. It has been argued in other 
contexts (Varshney, 2002) that dense associational life combined with avenues for cross-communal 
communication may provide a prophylactic against communal violence; this hypothesis remains to be tested 
systematically in the Indonesian context. 
Third, the analysis indicates both continuity and change in the politics of Indonesia’s Chinese minority. In the 
aftermath of democratization, many observers have noted a dramatic Chinese cultural renaissance in 
Indonesia, as well as greater Chinese community engagement in politics through mechanisms such as 
community groups and NGOs. The 2010 Medan mayoral election, especially when combined with the 2009 
legislative elections, is dramatic evidence that some ethnic Chinese Indonesians are moving increasingly 
confidently out of the realm of community politics into mainstream affairs. Indeed, Sofyan Tan’s candidacy 
was not the first time an ethnic Chinese had stood for election to a local government head position. Basuki 
Tjahaja Purnama was the first ethnic Chinese to be elected as a bupati [district head] in Indonesia when he 
won the election in Belitung Timur in Bangka-Belitung province in 2005. On the other hand, the very fact that 
Sofyan Tan’s campaign attracted such media attention and public comment points to the novelty of this 
development, and its relative rarity. Moreover, in both the political caution of many in Medan’s Chinese 
community and the hostility that was directed towards Sofyan Tan’s candidacy, we can see that the effects of 
the old politics of anti-Chinese scapegoating remain influential. 
Fourth, and more broadly, our analysis of the Medan election reveals how the political salience of identity 
categories is determined by context. Most societies are characterized by multiple and overlapping identity 
categories that political actors can draw upon for the purposes of mobilization: region, ethnicity, class, 
religion, gender and so on. Recent studies of ethnic politics that seek to go beyond the truism that identities 
are multiple and contingent have sought to investigate what factors might make one identity more politically 
salient than alternatives in a given context. In particular, analysts of ethnic identity and electoral politics have 
investigated how political elites and voters engage specific identities in order to maximize their opportunity 
for success and to increase their access to resources (for example, see Posner, 2005; Chandra, 2004).42 Such 
studies point to how shifts in political institutions and opportunities can bring about a switch in political 
actors’ choice of identity. Our findings support this approach. In the first round of the Medan mayoral 
election, when most candidates were members of the majority religion but also came from a variety of ethnic 
backgrounds, cross-communal appeals were the dominant mode of electioneering. In the second round, when 
the choice boiled down to two candidates, there was an abrupt switch of focus to religious identities; suddenly, 
religious exclusivism trumped ethnic inclusivism. Islam was a means to unite a majority of Medan’s ethnic 
communities against the minority candidate. The shift in public discourse is particularly noteworthy because 
                                                          
42 Both Chandra (2004) and Posner (2005) also suggest that strategic calculations about how to access patronage 
resources are an important underpinning of the choices voters make when identifying with ethnic parties or co-ethnic 
candidates. Our analysis of the Medan election does not investigate voter motivations for supporting co-ethnics or co-
religionists, but the work of these two scholars is certainly suggestive of dynamics that might be at play in local 
Indonesian electoral contexts. 
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we suspect that much of the public animus that was directed at Sofyan Tan was in private motivated by his 
Chinese ethnicity rather than his religion; this is certainly what some of our interviews suggest. 
While we hesitate to conclude overly sweeping lessons from our single case, this dynamic does seem to lead 
to a fifth and final concluding point about the relative political salience of religion and ethnicity in Indonesian 
politics. The dynamics of the second round of the vote suggest that ethnic scapegoating attracts greater social 
sanction than religious scapegoating, and that religion has greater legitimacy as a source of political authority 
than does ethnicity. After all, it would have been possible for Sofyan’s opponents to attempt to paint the 
contest as one between a pribumi and non-pribumi candidate, potentially appealing to an even larger 
constituency. Here our analysis matches those of other scholars who, while noting the decline of the vote for 
Islamic parties in national elections, have pointed to the growing propensity of mainstream secular-nationalist 
parties to rely on religious symbols and appeals to secure their legitimacy in the eyes of voters. As Rizal 
Sukma (2010, p 65) puts it, Islam is ‘in the process of being “mainstreamed” into the heart of Indonesia’s 
politics’. Moreover, we can identify relatively few instances when members of religious minorities have been 
elected to govern majority-Islamic districts or provinces in Indonesia (though we hasten to qualify this 
observation by noting that systematic collection of data is yet to occur). When such an outcome has occurred, 
it seems more often than not to have been a result of a minority candidate winning more than the minimum 
30% of the vote required for a first-round victory in conditions in which the Muslim vote was split between 
several candidates.43 In national-level elections, the tendency is even more stark: none of the presidential or 
vice-presidential candidates to contest the vote in the last national election were non-Muslims, though they 
came from a mixture of ethnic and regional backgrounds. Thus, while there were numerous peculiarities in the 
Medan case, it does point to a much deeper factor: religion is more important than ethnicity in Indonesian 
electoral politics. 
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